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 1 
The “New Administrative Law” of Wales 1 
 2 
 3 
Wales and England share a legal jurisdiction, yet commentators regularly refer only to 4 
“English administrative law” deploying the old adage, for Wales, see England. This focus on 5 
common law principles as the “greatest achievement”1 of modern administrative law side-6 
lines the contribution of the respective legislatures, in particular the National Assembly for 7 
Wales (Assembly). Since 1999 the Assembly has used its secondary and later primary law-8 
making powers to create distinctive administrative procedure laws applicable to devolved 9 
public bodies in Wales.
2
 These laws increasingly differ from Westminster legislation 10 
applying only to English public bodies.  11 
 The jurisdiction debate has been extensive, but at a basic level a legal jurisdiction 12 
requires a distinct body of law, applying to a defined territory, and administered by a separate 13 
set of institutions with competence over that body of law.
3
 There is already a corpus of law 14 
applying only to devolved Welsh public bodies, and although significant responsibility for 15 
the administration of justice is reserved, a set of separate institutions of justice have been 16 
established for Wales in the field of administrative justice.   17 
In this paper I argue that the emerging Welsh approach to administrative justice is 18 
characterised by administrative procedure legislation and “integrity” institutions,4 grounded 19 
in a political consensus that good administration is a civic good. Welsh administrative law is 20 
ostensibly designed to further social and economic equality, with public bodies required to 21 
collaborate, to integrate their activities, and to involve the general public in their decision-22 
making. This stress on public involvement is also evident in proposals to codify Welsh law, 23 
to improve its accessibility and to cement its distinctiveness from English law. Wales has also 24 
taken a leadership role in furthering norms of global administrative law, whilst attempting to 25 
site its local administrative justice system in an increasingly “righted” international context.  26 
                                                     
1
 As Lord Diplock put it in R. v IRC ex parte National Federation for the Self Employed [1982] AC 617, 641; 
“progress towards a comprehensive system of administrative law…having been the greatest achievement of the 
English courts in my judicial lifetime” (emphasis added).  
2
 The Government of Wales Acts provide that Assembly legislation applies in relation to Wales, but extends 
over England and Wales, giving the courts in both countries authority to interpret and enforce Assembly 
legislation. 
3
 See e.g., R. Percival, “How to do things with jurisdictions: Wales and the jurisdiction question” [2017] P.L. 
249; National Assembly for Wales Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee (2012). Inquiry into the 
Establishment of a Separate Welsh Jurisdiction: Consultation Responses.  
4
 Including innovative un-elected methods of administrative state accountability, such as ombudsmen, 
commissioners and regulators.   
 2 
In presenting this distinctive Welsh approach, I also outline some challenges; not least 27 
the difficulty of pursuing Welsh socialist legislation alongside a capitalist neo-liberal agenda 28 
at Westminster.  The historic lack of primary legislative power, and continued reservation of 29 
the single legal jurisdiction, has seen Wales favour procedural regulatory tools to improve 30 
administrative decision-making, but often without correlative primary legislative rights 31 
enabling individuals to enforce these duties through the courts. Enforcement is largely the 32 
preserve of quasi-political institutions with varying powers to promote and encourage 33 
compliance through systematic investigations often on self-chosen themes, and with remedial 34 
recommendations that are usually not legally binding. This approach relies heavily on 35 
catalysing cultural change within public bodies and broader civil society. The role of the 36 
courts has so far been peripheral; there have been few, if any, judgments of the 37 
Administrative Court in Wales turning directly on Welsh administrative procedure duties, 38 
and little judicial or practitioner commentary. However, recent developments suggest that 39 
Wales is gearing up to a more “juridified”5 approach. These developments include; reforms 40 
to increase the coherence, professionalism and independence of the set of devolved Welsh 41 
tribunals,
6
 codification of Welsh law,
7
 establishing a Commission on Justice in Wales,
8
 42 
proposing a human rights act for Wales,
9
 and an overall harder line that devolution of justice 43 
and the break-up of the single legal jurisdiction are inevitable.
10
 These developments could 44 
see tribunals, courts and the Assembly in Wales become more directly engaged with 45 
delivering and scrutinising administrative justice.  46 
Whilst the integrity architecture in Wales requires further reform, and the tide of a 47 
more juridified approach is incoming, the Welsh experiment with administrative justice 48 
provides lessons for other jurisdictions, particularly at a time of growing dissatisfaction with 49 
traditional legal and political mechanisms of administrative state accountability. 50 
 51 
                                                     
5
 “Juridification” is an ambiguous term. In this context it is taken to mean greater emphasis on specific 
individual rights to redress against public bodies, associated with a more formalistic approach including 
increased use primary legislation, and a significant role for the legislature in scrutinising such legislation and for 
the courts in interpreting it.   
6
 Wales Act 2017, Pt.3.   
7
 Draft Legislation (Wales) Bill 2018 and Law Commission, Form and Accessibility of the Law Applicable in 
Wales (Law Com No. 366, 2016). 
8
 Established in 2017 concerned with “ensuring that the jurisdictional arrangements…address and reflect the 
role of justice in the governance and prosperity of Wales as well as distinct issues that arise in Wales”, online at:  
https://beta.gov.wales/commission-justice-wales 
9
 J. Miles AM, A Human Rights Act for Wales? annual Eileen Illtyd Memorial Lecture on human rights 
(Swansea University 15 November 2018).  
10
 J. Miles AM, Legal wales Conference (Aberystwyth University 12 October 2018); 
https://gov.wales/newsroom/improvingpublicservices/2018/181012-a-welsh-legal-jurisdiction-and-a-devolved-
justice-system-is-inevitable/?lang=en 
 3 
Welsh Devolution 52 
 53 
Devolution to Wales is a process not an event. The First Assembly created under the 54 
Government of Wales Act 1998 had no primary legislative power, being a “carefully 55 
constructed compromise”11 between politicians opposed to devolution and those wanting a 56 
Welsh parliament. The arrangements were not practical, or widely supported. The Assembly 57 
was originally established as a “body corporate” containing an executive (the Government) 58 
and a legislature (the Assembly) with no separation between them. This body took over 59 
functions of the UK Government Wales Office, gaining only minimal secondary law-making 60 
powers, the use of which had to be authorised by the UK Parliament.  61 
 The Government of Wales Act (GoWA) 2006 replaced the original design with a 62 
separate National Assembly (legislature) with powers to enact laws, known as Measures, in 63 
specific fields.
12
 These powers were conferred piecemeal under Legislative Competence 64 
Orders negotiated between the Welsh Ministers and the UK Government, confirmed by the 65 
Assembly and UK Parliament. The process was complex, time-consuming, dependent upon 66 
good inter-governmental relations, and largely impenetrable to the public. Welsh 67 
Government had policy responsibilities in areas including health, education, local 68 
government and transport, but limited legislative power to pursue its objectives. This position 69 
of responsibility without power added to public dissatisfaction with the Assembly, and the 70 
limits to its law-making powers were not widely understood.  71 
 The policy underpinning GoWA was to transfer specific functions in areas where the 72 
Secretary of State for Wales had pursued distinctive policies. This was in contrast to the 73 
Scotland Act 1998 which extended “over all aspects of Scottish life and society other than 74 
those reserved for the UK Parliament”.13 Following a referendum held in 2011, primary 75 
legislative powers were transferred in areas of devolved Welsh competence, but the 76 
devolution settlement overall remained one of conferred powers and Westminster continued 77 
to be Wales’ other Parliament. Some executive functions covering devolved matters could be 78 
exercised by Westminster or Whitehall with little Assembly scrutiny.  79 
Influential bodies recommended moving to a reserved powers model to provide 80 
greater clarity about devolved functions.
14
 In the political climate following the referendum 81 
                                                     
11
 UCL Constitution Unit, Commentary on the Welsh White Paper (September 2017) 1.  
12
 GoWA 2006, Pt. 3 and Sched 5.  
13
 House of Commons Justice Committee Fifth Report of Session 2008-09, Devolution: A Decade on [12]. 
14
 The Richard Commission on the Powers and Electoral Arrangements of the National Assembly for Wales 
(reporting in 2004): 
 4 
on Scottish independence, the UK Government committed to delivering this model, now 82 
enacted in the Wales Act 2017. The 2017 Act has been criticised for its complex framework 83 
of general reservations, specific reservations, and exceptions to reservations.
15
 Rick Rawlings 84 
refers to the 2017 Act as “carrying the seeds of its own destruction”,16 lacking constitutional 85 
vision, representing an elite form of constitution making, and leading to an excessive 86 
fragmentation of powers.
17
  87 
The Welsh Government proposed its own Government and Laws in Wales Bill, 88 
expressing a more simplified settlement and longer-term constitutional vision, what Rawlings 89 
describes as a written constitution for a sub-state polity. The Welsh Government Bill 90 
included provision for immediate recognition (on enactment) of a distinct Welsh legal 91 
jurisdiction, and for establishing a separate legal jurisdiction in the longer-term. The 2017 92 
Act, on the other hand, states that there is a body of Welsh law including laws made by the 93 
Assembly and Welsh Ministers.
18
 This section was a political compromise; the product of 94 
UK Government resistance to breaking up the combined England and Wales legal 95 
jurisdiction.  96 
 97 
A Principles-based Approach to Administrative Law 98 
 99 
Despite the practical-political compromises, a principles-based approach to good 100 
administration has infused the work of bodies reporting on the devolution of further 101 
legislative powers to Wales, and on jurisdictional arrangements.
19
 Such principles include 102 
accountability, clarity, coherence, collaboration, efficiency, equity, stability and 103 
subsidiarity.
20
 Rawlings attributes this interest in principles to a desire to revitalise the UK 104 
territorial constitution in light of fragmentation pressures, and to increase Wales’ political 105 
leverage.
21
 This understanding focuses primarily on how Wales is perceived as a 106 
                                                                                                                                                                     
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100404200945/http:/www.richardcommission.gov.uk/content/final
report/report-e.pdf and the Silk Commission (2001-2014) with Silk Part II being concerned with Welsh 
legislative power, online at: https://www.assembly.wales/en/bus-home/research/Pages/research-silk-
commission.aspx#Silk%20Part%202  
15
 R. Wyn Jones, “Is it our fate to be governed on the basis of this nonsense?” Wales Online October 2016 
(criticising the Wales Bill): https://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/politics/richard-wyn-jones-wales-bill-
12091891  
16
 BBC News online, 5 March 2017, ‘Wales Act carries seeds of own destruction, says Rawlings’: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-39159133 
17
 R. Rawlings, “The Strange Reconstitution of Wales” [2018] P.L. 62.  
18
 GoWA s.A2.  
19
 See sources at fn.14.  
20
 Specifically noted in Silk Part II fn.14.  
21
 fn.17. 
 5 
constitutional player within the UK, missing the centrality of principles to the development of 107 
a specifically Welsh approach to its domestic administrative law. Welsh administrative law 108 
can be seen as anchored in a political consensus that good governance is ‘good for you’.22 109 
This sentiment is especially evident in administrative justice. For example, soon after its 110 
formation, the Committee for Administrative Justice and Tribunals in Wales (CAJTW) 111 
considered it a priority to develop Administrative Justice Principles for Wales. The Principles 112 
designate administrative justice as a fundamental right and as cornerstone to social justice,
23
 113 
noting the link between administrative justice and state accountability through means other 114 
than the ballot box.  115 
A possible benefit of this principles-based approach is that it could bolster the 116 
legitimacy of Welsh administrative law at an apparent time of crisis for more traditional 117 
hierarchical conceptions.
24
 Administrative state “legitimacy crises” are a global phenomenon; 118 
the context in each nation is distinct, but a shared theme is of clashes between technocratic 119 
expertise needed to deal with the complexities of modern governance, and the response to 120 
reinstall citizen statesmen serving the populace through common sense and moral values.
25
 In 121 
the UK this is perhaps best captured by the refrain that people have “had enough of 122 
experts”.26 In Wales public satisfaction with Government, and with public services provision, 123 
tends on the whole to be higher than the UK average;
27
 but when coupled with patchy public 124 
understanding of devolution, and Wales effectively being a “one party state”, this can lead to 125 
political complacency.
28
 Wales may still be better placed than many nations to take 126 
advantage of the traditional state-centric account of administrative law. However, as a 127 
relative newcomer Welsh administrative law is emerging in a challenging era of 128 
                                                     
22
 M. Drakeford, “Social Justice in a Devolved Wales” (2007) 15(2) Journal of Public Finance and Public 
Choice 171.  
23
 CAJTW, Administrative Justice: A Cornerstone of Social Justice in Wales; Reform priorities for the Fifth 
Assembly (20016): https://gov.wales/docs/cabinetstatements/2016/160729cornerstoneofsocialjustice.pdf 
24
 See e.g., JB. Auby, “La bataille de San Romano. Réflexions sur les évolutions récentes du droit 
administrative” (2001) 57(11) ActualIté Juridique droit Administratif 912.  
25
 P. Wallach, “The administrative state’s legitimacy crisis” Center for Effective Public Management at 
Brookings (April 2016): https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Administrative-state-
legitimacy-crisis_FINAL.pdf 
26
 M. Gove (then Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice) June 2016.  
27
 L. Carter-Davies and S. Martin, Improving Public Services: Existing Evidence and Evidence Needs (Public 
Policy Institute for Wales 2016). That said, the 2018 National Survey for Wales shows satisfaction with health 
services (GPs and NHS hospital care) has been falling, as has satisfaction with education (with a marked decline 
in people’s satisfaction with secondary education provision): https://gov.wales/docs/statistics/2018/180620-
national-survey-wales-2017-18-headline-results-en.pdf 
28
 Labour has dominated Welsh Government since its inception. In “Wales, a one-party state, prepares for a 
transition of power” The Economist (26 April 2018), R. Wyn Jones is reported as commenting, “a long period in 
power unchallenged can cause a ‘living decay’, with little incentive for the incumbent to come up with new 
ideas”: https://www.economist.com/news/britain/21741161-carwyn-joness-unexpected-resignation-leaves-
labour-looking-new-first-minister-wales-  
 6 
globalisation, constitutionalisation, destatisation, decentralisation, and privatisation (the latter 129 
being something even Wales is not immune to). Administrative law has had to evolve to 130 
survive, and in some ways Welsh administrative law aligns with characteristics of so-called 131 
“new administrative law”.29 This includes favouring approaches (to practice and scholarship) 132 
that are multi-disciplinary, pluralistic (in principles, institutions and methods), and that 133 
emphasise horizontal collaboration (inter-institutional collaboration) and citizen engagement. 134 
For Wales, this begins with the political foundations of administrative law.  135 
In 2007, Mark Drakeford (formerly a Welsh Government policy advisor, now a 136 
Welsh Minister and contender for the First Ministership) proposed a Welsh commitment to 137 
social justice anchored in a set of core principles including the value of good governance, an 138 
ethic of participation, and improving equality of outcome.
30
 This connection to substantive 139 
equality has remained evident since former First Minister Rhodri Morgan’s 2002 “clear red 140 
water” speech where he argued that Wales should take a different approach to the politics of 141 
Westminster, noting: “Our commitment to equality leads directly to a model of the 142 
relationship between the government and the individual which regards the individual as a 143 
citizen rather than as a consumer”.31  The 2007-2011 “One Wales” / “Cymru’n Un” coalition 144 
agreement between Labour and Plaid Cymru, reinforced this approach with a ‘progressive 145 
consensus’ committing to “social justice, sustainability and inclusivity.”32 The political 146 
majority in Wales continues to back state provision of public services and “progressive 147 
universalism” supporting those most in need.33  148 
 Equality features prominently in Welsh politics, including in speeches of the current 149 
Counsel General for Wales, Jeremy Miles AM. In his address to the Public Law Project 150 
Wales Conference 2018 he stressed that substantive equality remains at the heart of Welsh 151 
public law being “one of our most basic moral obligations”.34 In his 2018 National 152 
                                                     
29
 S. Cassese, “New paths for administrative law: A manifesto” (2012)10(3) ICON 603. 
30
 fn.22.  
31
 R. Morgan, speech to the National Centre for Public Policy (Swansea December 2002), online at: 
https://www.sochealth.co.uk/the-socialist-health-association/sha-country-and-branch-organisation/sha-
wales/clear-red-water/ 
32
 Welsh Assembly Government (2007), One Wales: A progressive agenda for the government of Wales: An 
agreement between the Labour and Plaid Cymru Groups in the National Assembly: 
http://www.maniffesto.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/onewalese.pdf 
33
 M. Wall and S. Williams, “Seeking Evidence for a Welsh Progressive Consensus: Party Positioning in the 
2016 National Assembly for Wales Election” (2017) Parliamentary Affairs 1. 
34
 PLP Wales Conference, Promoting Equalities for a fairer and more equal Wales (26 March 2018): 
http://www.publiclawproject.org.uk/data/resources/284/Public-Law-Wales-Project-final-speech-for-
publication.pdf 
 7 
Eisteddfod speech, he explicitly connected the potential for further devolution of 153 
responsibility for the administration of justice, with a social equality agenda,
35
 speaking of: 154 
 155 
“A journey to realise a vision of Wales where justice – in the sense of a system of 156 
rights and redress – reflects the values and particular characteristics of Welsh society, 157 
but also a fuller vision of justice, which embraces also, social and economic justice 158 
and a journey the next leg of which will surely feature prominently, as part of a 159 
compelling vision of a just Wales, the development of a distinct justice system for our 160 
nation”.36 161 
 162 
Arguing that such developments are “about much more than the simple accumulation of 163 
powers for its own sake”, the Counsel General reinforced Welsh commitment to fundamental 164 
values inherent in a just society, at a time when such values are in global retreat. Welsh 165 
politics generally encourages a principled approach to international rights instruments and 166 
global governance; seeking a unique place for Wales in the world, as a comparatively 167 
committed unionist, but with aspirations of global responsibility, which have become central 168 
to its domestic administrative law.
37
  169 
 170 
Welsh Administrative Law and Proceduralism 171 
 172 
The clearest example of a commitment to principles of global resonance is in the Well-being 173 
of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015 (WFGA). This places public bodies under a duty to 174 
practice sustainable development. WFGA defines seven well-being Goals; (1) a more 175 
prosperous Wales,
38
 (2) a resilient Wales,
39
 (3) a healthier Wales,
40
 (4) a more equal Wales,
41
 176 
                                                     
35
 Bevan Foundation at the National Eisteddfod, 4 August 2018: https://41ydvd1cuyvlonsm03mpf21pub-
wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Eisteddfod-2018-final-E.pdf 
36
 Ibid 5.  
37
 J. Hunt and R. Minto, “Between intergovernmental relations and paradiplomacy: Wales and the Brexit of the 
Regions” (2017) 19(4) The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 647; Bangor/SLSA, Devolved 
Nations and International Law (June 2017) 
http://www.slsa.ac.uk/images/2017spring/SLSA_Devolved_Nations_and_International_Law_Programme.pdf 
38
 An innovative, productive and low carbon society which recognises the limits of the global environment and 
therefore uses resources efficiently and proportionately (including acting on climate change); and which 
develops a skilled and well-educated population in an economy which generates wealth and provides 
employment opportunities, allowing people to take advantage of the wealth generated through securing decent 
work. 
39
 A nation which maintains and enhances a biodiverse natural environment with healthy functioning 
ecosystems that support social, economic and ecological resilience and the capacity to adapt to change (for 
example climate change). 
 8 
(5) a Wales of cohesive communities,
42
 (6) a Wales of vibrant culture and thriving Welsh 177 
language
43
 and, (7) a globally responsible Wales.
44
 Public bodies are required to carry out 178 
sustainable development, to be achieved by setting and publishing Well-being Objectives 179 
which show how the body will maximise its contribution to achieving the Goals.  180 
WFGA is an example of Welsh administrative procedure law centred on principles of social, 181 
economic and inter-generational equality. Such new legislation seeks to control and influence 182 
administrative decision-making, but it rarely endows individuals with explicit legally 183 
enforceable rights against public bodies. The approach has been to develop procedural duties 184 
requiring public bodies to show they have taken rights and other values into account, 185 
alongside a set of ‘integrity’ branch institutions with varying powers to promote and enforce 186 
compliance through systematic investigations. In this section I examine some relevant 187 
legislation, and the courts’ comparative lack of reaction to it, in the next section I consider 188 
the role of the integrity branch.   189 
Equality is an early example where Welsh Government was the first UK Government 190 
to bring in specific regulations in order for public bodies to better perform their public sector 191 
duties under the UK Equality Act 2010. In 2011 the Welsh Ministers enacted Regulations 192 
identifying public authorities in Wales for the purposes of imposing additional planning, 193 
monitoring and reporting duties.
45
 Listed public bodies are required to publish “equality 194 
objectives” or to provide reasons for not doing so.46 Authorities are also required to comply 195 
with “engagement” provisions and have due regard to “relevant information” when 196 
considering and designing their equality objectives.
47
 WFGA Well-being Goal of a more 197 
equal Wales is also said to bring into force (in Wales only) a requirement similar to that of, 198 
currently not in force, section 1 of the UK Equality Act 2010. This requires relevant 199 
authorities to “have due regard to the desirability of exercising [functions] in a way that is 200 
designed to reduce the inequalities of outcome which result from socio-economic 201 
disadvantage.” To date, whilst some general duties under Welsh equality law have been 202 
                                                                                                                                                                     
40
 A society in which people’s physical and mental well-being is maximised and in which choices and 
behaviours that benefit future health are understood. 
41
 A society that enables people to fulfil their potential no matter what their background or circumstances 
(including their socio-economic background and circumstances). 
42
 Attractive, viable, safe and well-connected communities. 
43
 A society that promotes and protects culture, heritage and the Welsh language, and which encourages people 
to participate in the arts, and sports and recreation. 
44
 A nation which, when doing anything to improve the economic, social, environmental and cultural well-being 
of Wales, takes account of whether doing such a thing may make a positive contribution to global well-being. 
45
 Equality Act 2010, Pt.2, Sched.19 (supplemented and amended by the Equality Act 2010 (Specification of 
Relevant Welsh Authorities) Order 2011). 
46
 The Equality Act 2010 (Statutory Duties) (Wales) Regulations 2011.  
47
 Ibid, Regs 4 and 5.  
 9 
raised in judicial review applications, this has been a secondary, and apparently poorly 203 
argued ground.
48
 There has been no substantive judicial review hearing or reported 204 
permission decision examining Welsh equality duties. 205 
Another example is children’s rights, where a distinctly Welsh approach has been 206 
evident from the first Assembly. This approach is based on the language of rights and 207 
entitlement, as opposed to the UK Government’s focus on welfare. Under the Rights of 208 
Children and Young Persons (Wales) Measure 2011 (Children’s Rights Measure) Welsh 209 
Ministers and social services bodies are required to have “due regard” to relevant provisions 210 
of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). The Additional Learning Needs 211 
and Education Tribunal (Wales) Act 2018 extends the due regard duty to bodies exercising 212 
relevant functions in the education context.  213 
The due regard duty was born from a range of factors, including political impetus for 214 
significant use of enhanced legislative competence, whilst also rushing the legislation 215 
through before the outgoing First Minister was due to stand down (leaving little time for 216 
consultation). Had there been further consultation, the due regard duty could potentially have 217 
been extended to all devolved Welsh public bodies. Aside from due regard, other available 218 
options were a light touch requirement to “take into consideration” the UNCRC, later enacted 219 
in Scotland, or the stronger individual right to public body compliance (for example as 220 
concerns ECHR rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 sections 6 and 7). This latter 221 
approach was felt to be too radical a departure given the combined legal jurisdiction – though 222 
more for pragmatic reasons than lack of legislative competence. Even if such provisions were 223 
definitively within competence, the Secretary of State could still intervene to prevent the Bill 224 
going for Royal Assent if he had reasonable grounds to believe that the divergence would 225 
have an adverse effect on the operation of the law as it applies in England.
49
 As enacted, due 226 
regard functions as an upstream preventative provision designed to generate systematic 227 
changes; it does not confer new legal rights on individuals.
50
  228 
The Children’s Rights Measure makes no provision about what an individual can do if 229 
they believe the due regard duty has been breached. During legislative scrutiny, it was argued 230 
that an explicit new route would be unnecessary given other avenues, including: complaining 231 
to the Welsh Government; contacting the Children’s Commissioner for Wales; complaining 232 
to an Assembly Member or seeking judicial review. However, there is yet to be any reported 233 
                                                     
48
 Administrative Court Lawyer for Wales, to PLP Wales Conference (March 2018).  
49
 GoWA 2006, s.114(10(c)). 
50
 J. Williams, “Implications for Administrative Justice of Wales’ Unique Child Rights Law”, in S. Nason (ed), 
Administrative Justice in Wales and Comparative Perspectives (Cardiff, UWP, 2017) p.33.  
 10 
judgment finding breach of the children’s rights due regard duty. Practitioners have spoken of 234 
difficulties in seeking permission to raise breach of the duty as a ground of judicial review 235 
before the Administrative Court in Wales.
51
 This is concerning given evidence of variable 236 
quality; the Children’s Rights Measure introduces regulatory tools known as Children’s 237 
Rights Impact Assessments (CRIAs), and research has found their implementation to be 238 
inconsistent, with expectations of good practice departed from.
52
  239 
Another example of new administrative procedure legislation is WFGA, under which 240 
public bodies are required to carry out sustainable development, to be achieved by setting and 241 
publishing Well-being Objectives showing how the body will maximise its contribution to 242 
achieving the Well-being Goals. WFGA makes no reference to rights; the definition of well-243 
being is less rights-focused than that contained in other Assembly legislation such as the 244 
Social Services and Well-Being (Wales) Act 2014 which defines well-being as including 245 
“securing rights and entitlements”.53 WFGA also makes no direct reference to international 246 
norms such as the EU and UN sustainable development standards, yet the UN refers to the 247 
legislation as “world leading”.54 Under WFGA, public bodies are required to “take all 248 
reasonable steps” to meet Well-being Objectives, but there has so far been no reported 249 
litigation alleging breach of this duty.  250 
 Another example is the Public Health (Wales) Act 2017 which empowers Welsh 251 
Ministers to introduce regulations providing for Health Impact Assessments (HIA). 252 
Regulations are not yet in force, but eventually relevant bodies will have to publish their 253 
HIAs and take them into account when exercising functions in connection with which the 254 
assessments were carried out, while also acting in accordance with the sustainable 255 
development principle.  256 
Of these new procedural duties, the most onerously worded is the requirement to 257 
“take all reasonable steps” to meet Well-Being Objectives under WFGA, whereas the Public 258 
Health legislation rows back to the ostensibly less demanding requirement to “take into 259 
account” HIAs. Whether this is any more or less extensive than the duty to “have due regard” 260 
to children’s rights contained the Children’s Rights legislation, is hard to foresee. Leading 261 
                                                     
51
 Michael Imperato (Watkins and Gunn) PLP Wales Conference (March 2018).  
52
 S. Hoffman, Evaluation of the Welsh Government’s Child Rights Impact Assessment procedure under the 
Children’s Rights Scheme pursuant to the Rights of Children and Young Persons (Wales) Measure 2011 
(Swansea University 2015).  
53
 Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014, s.2(2)(f).  
54
 Nikhil Seth, Director of Division for Sustainable Development, United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, comments made ahead of an international Sustainable Development event held in Cardiff in 
2015. Welsh Government Press Release: https://gov.wales/newsroom/environmentandcountryside/2015/150429-
future-generations-act/?lang=en 
 11 
practitioner Emyr Lewis notes that HIAs introduce “a further layer of high-level soft law 262 
regulation governing the activities of public authorities in Wales, which could further 263 
complicate the processes of decision-making”.55 These procedural duties can be seen as part 264 
of a global trend towards proceduralisation of administrative law. They are coupled with 265 
tools to regulate public body decision-making, including increased used of impact 266 
assessments such as CRIAs and in future HIAs. The difficulty comes in ensuring that these 267 
instruments are more than tick-box exercises, adding to bureaucracy without providing any 268 
greater practical protection for individual rights. In order to achieve this there ought also to 269 
be strong and effective rights to individual redress, but the devolution context makes this 270 
particularly challenging for Wales. The courts enforcing Welsh legislation are the courts of 271 
England and Wales, staffed by the judges of the England and Wales judiciary, applying 272 
general principles of English and Welsh common law, and judicial review of administrative 273 
action is a reserved matter. Since 2009 Wales has had a local Administrative Court, ending 274 
previous London-centricity. However, the Court is not explicitly a Welsh institution, it is a 275 
satellite managed by HMCTS England and Wales. Unlike the other England and Wales 276 
Administrative Courts (in Birmingham, Leeds, Manchester and London), the Cardiff 277 
Administrative Court is responsible for administering claims originating from two Court 278 
Circuit Regions, the Wales Circuit, and the geographical Region covered by the Western 279 
Circuit (South West England). Up to half of all claims issued and determined in Cardiff 280 
concern the South West of England. Since the Court opened there has been some slight 281 
increase in the number of judicial review claims issued pertaining to Wales, but much of this 282 
increase comes from a rise in unrepresented litigation. There has been no discernible increase 283 
in the administrative law litigation activities of lawyers based in Wales.
56
 Recent England 284 
and Wales wide reforms have also had a significant impact on administrative law litigation. 285 
Since around 2013 there has been a drop in judicial review applications across the England 286 
and Wales Administrative Court coinciding with reforms to judicial procedure, and to costs 287 
and legal aid payment regimes. Legal aid cuts imposed by the Legal Aid Sentencing and 288 
Punishment of Offenders Act (LASPO) 2012 have had a disproportionately negative impact 289 
in Wales, including on Welsh public lawyers.
57
 In terms of broader constitutional justice, 290 
difficulties accessing judicial review can negatively impact on the rule of law as well as the 291 
                                                     
55
 E. Lewis, Public Health (Wales) Act 2017 – making Wales a leader in public health (Lexis 26/07/2017)  
https://www.blakemorgan.co.uk/media/filer_public/80/ec/80ece5c2-1556-4d44-bfb8-
a4f3b4fbeea7/public_health_wales_act_2017making_wales_a_leader_in_public_health.pdf 
56
 Submission from PLP and S. Nason to Commission on Justice in Wales. 
57
 Submission from PLP of evidence to Commission on Justice in Wales (June 2018): 
https://beta.gov.wales/sites/default/files/publications/2018-08/Submission-from-public-law-project.pdf 
 12 
legitimacy of administration, yet the nature of devolution limits Wales’ capacity to address 292 
this problem. It is not surprising then that Wales has found alternative means to bolster the 293 
legitimacy of its administrative state, including by developing its integrity branch.  294 
 295 
The Integrity Branch 296 
 297 
Welsh administrative procedure law often contains no explicit legal rights to redress for 298 
individuals, but it does provide alternative means of enforcement, deploying the quasi-299 
political power of integrity branch institutions to incentivise systematic change. A plethora of 300 
such institutions have been established in Wales, each created at different stages in the 301 
devolution process, underpinned by different types of legislation and with varying degrees of 302 
accountability to the Assembly.  303 
There is a Public Services Ombudsman for Wales (PSOW) initially created by 304 
Westminster legislation, appointed by and accountable to the Assembly, and various 305 
Commissioners, some created by Westminster legislation, others by Assembly legislation, all 306 
of whom are appointed by Welsh Government. The Commissioners perform variable roles 307 
and are subject to different methods of external accountability and internal governance.
58
 308 
There are principled reasons for at least some divergence, however, as Mike Shooter put it in 309 
his review of the Children’s Commissioner for Wales, the “uncertainty breeds confusion and 310 
misconception”.59 One common misconception, for example, is that the Welsh Language 311 
Commissioner functions as a language ombudsman, whereas in fact the role is more 312 
regulatory. 313 
The Welsh Language (Wales) Measure 2011 was Wales’ first fully home-grown 314 
attempt at devising an administrative justice regime and provides a cautionary tale. The 2011 315 
Measure created a system of Welsh Language Standards, a Welsh Language Commissioner 316 
and a Welsh Language Tribunal.
60
 The regime has since been criticised as excessively 317 
bureaucratic, it is said to focus on administrative procedures for protecting the language by 318 
detailing the role and functions of the regulator (the Commissioner) and the regulator’s 319 
regulator (the Welsh Language Tribunal) at the expense of outlining the content of language 320 
rights. The Measure rarely addresses individuals as beneficiaries of rights and public bodies 321 
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as duty bearers, contradicting expressed Welsh concern for public involvement.
61
 The 322 
Measure also does not refer to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, and 323 
has subsequently been described as an “incomplete or immature version of an emerging 324 
international norm”.62 Individuals cannot directly challenge the content of Welsh Language 325 
Standards developed by the Welsh Language Commissioner. However, if a complainant 326 
considers there has been a flaw in the Commissioner’s investigation into compliance with its 327 
own Standards, they can appeal to the Welsh Language Tribunal.  328 
The bureaucratic nature of the regime is not its only flaw, the Commissioner is also 329 
insufficiently independent from Government, being a regulator on behalf of Welsh 330 
Government but also legally bound to monitor Government compliance with Welsh 331 
Language Standards.
63
 A 2017 White Paper has since proposed reforms aimed at “reducing 332 
bureaucracy” and ensuring “value for money”.64 The hope is to strike a more proportionate 333 
balance between promoting the Welsh language and regulating compliance with Standards. 334 
The Welsh Language Commissioner will be abolished and replaced with a Welsh Language 335 
Commission. Under the new structure Welsh Government will be responsible for making and 336 
imposing Standards, and the Welsh Language Commission will enforce compliance with the 337 
Standards and promote language use. However, the new Welsh Language Commission will 338 
continue to monitor Welsh Government compliance with Standards, despite being a 339 
Government appointed body, and if anything, individual rights to redress will be watered 340 
down. In its earlier consultation, Welsh Government rejected a proposal for enacting a right 341 
to use Welsh in primary legislation. This was seen as too costly given the limited extent of 342 
Welsh language skills in the workforce; it was said that a large list of exceptions, where the 343 
right would apply in an attenuated form or not at all, would be “inevitable”.65  344 
The new proposals emphasize internal processes, with individuals being required to 345 
complain first to the public body before taking their complaint to the Welsh language 346 
Commission. This may be an improvement on the previous situation where the Welsh 347 
Language Commissioner sometimes had to investigate despite a public body having resolved 348 
the issue before the required investigation could be completed. Nevertheless, the reforms 349 
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have been described as a step backwards by language campaigners and Plaid Cymru.
66
 350 
Individual rights could be diminished; first, by the provision that the Welsh Language 351 
Commission should only investigate complaints in serious cases; second, by watering down 352 
the content of the Standards;
67
 third, introducing a permission requirement into some appeals 353 
to the Welsh Language Tribunal. The proposals emphasise upstream promotive and 354 
preventative measures to protect the language, whereas other options would have also given 355 
stronger downstream rights to individuals. For example, the PSOW could potentially have 356 
been given power to handle all Welsh language complaints, with the new Commission taking 357 
on regulatory and promotive roles.
68
 The PSOW already acts as an independent complaint-358 
handler with regards to the Assembly Commission, which is responsible for the day-to-day 359 
running of the Welsh language services of the Assembly. This proposal was rejected on the 360 
basis that it would require further legislation to increase the PSOW’s powers and jurisdiction 361 
that could have implications extending beyond Welsh language policy.
69
 Another option 362 
would be a primary legislative right to use Welsh, combined with a right of appeal to the 363 
Welsh Language Tribunal. This latter proposal is also non-starter in practice, given Welsh 364 
Government’s rejection of a legislative right to use Welsh.  365 
 Whilst the Welsh Language Commissioner is primarily a regulatory body, other 366 
Welsh Commissioners are more akin to National Human Rights Institutions responsible for 367 
monitoring the observance of international human rights obligations. Whilst UK legislation 368 
establishing the Children’s Commissioner for Wales and Older People’s Commissioner for 369 
Wales makes no mention of rights, the more detailed Assembly Regulations flesh out the 370 
Commissioners’ roles and responsibilities with explicit reference to promoting compliance 371 
with international human rights. These two Commissioners are primarily responsible for 372 
identifying and reviewing systematic issues in public administration impacting on rights. 373 
They also have some powers of inquiry into individual complaints, though many such 374 
complaints are practically dealt with by sign-posting to another institution, or by providing 375 
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advice, rather than a full inquiry.
70
 Such sign-posting can plug gaps in the administrative 376 
justice system, but raises questions about the effectiveness and accessibility of early dispute 377 
resolution. The power of the Commissioners, and also the PSOW, to “name and shame” 378 
public bodies regularly seems to make the difference, and these integrity institutions tend to 379 
be seen as more accessible than the Administrative Court.  380 
There are increasingly blurred boundaries between the roles of the PSOW and the 381 
Commissioners, including the extent to which each institution acts a “fire-fighter” 382 
(determining individual complaints) and a “fire-watcher” (conducting investigations to 383 
address systematic issues often on an “own initiative” basis71 without the need for an 384 
individual complaint). How the Commissioners chose which individual complaints to 385 
investigate can cause particular dilemmas with respect to political independence and public 386 
perception. Not least because the Commissioners are seen as quasi-political institutions and 387 
there have been allegations of political bias and cronysim in the appointment of most of the 388 
Commissioners to date.
72
 389 
The newest Welsh Commissioner, the Future Generations Commissioner for Wales 390 
established by WFGA has no individual complaint handling jurisdiction. The main 391 
responsibility of the Future Generations Commissioner is to monitor and report on how well 392 
Local Authority Public Service Boards are complying with their duties to promote well-393 
being.
73
 Under WFGA public bodies are also required to act in in particular ways when 394 
carrying out sustainable development, and the Future Generations Commissioner has a role in 395 
promoting these “Five Ways of Working”. The Ways of Working emphasise inter-396 
institutional accountability, enabling citizen participation and furthering opportunities for 397 
deliberative democracy. They are; (1) long-termism,
74
 (2) integration,
75
 (3) involvement,
76
 (4) 398 
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collaboration,
77
 and (5) prevention.
78
 Other Welsh initiatives on the theme of public 399 
engagement include co-operation, co-decision and co-production
79
 in the design of the 400 
administrative state and the services it provides. 401 
 402 
Towards “juridification”? 403 
 404 
Extensive evaluation of the impact of new Welsh administrative procedure duties is beyond 405 
the scope of one paper. But even assuming that there has been significant “soft” impact in 406 
terms of cultural change with knock-on improvements to public body performance, there has 407 
clearly been less hard-law bite, as evidenced by the lack of case law. Aside from costs, and 408 
the seemingly limited litigation practice of public lawyers based in Wales, minimal  409 
juridification may also be due to the difficulties of accessing Welsh law.  410 
The law applicable to Wales is fragmented over Welsh, English and Welsh, British, 411 
and UK sources. Following Consultation, the Law Commission recommended bringing 412 
together legislation whose subject matter is within Welsh competence, but which is scattered 413 
across various sources, and reforming that law where appropriate. Consolidation with reform 414 
is not unusual for England and Wales, the innovation is in the recommendation that “the 415 
ultimate goal of the Welsh Government and the National Assembly should be the 416 
organisation of primary legislation into a series of codes dealing comprehensively with 417 
particular areas of Welsh law”.80 In response, Welsh Government’s Draft Legislation (Wales) 418 
Bill 2018, places the Counsel General for Wales under a duty to keep the accessibility of 419 
Welsh law under review. For each Assembly term, the Welsh Ministers and Counsel General 420 
must prepare a programme of what they intend to do to improve the accessibility of Welsh 421 
law. This must include proposed activities “intended to – (a) contribute to an ongoing process 422 
of consolidating and codifying Welsh law, (b) maintain the form of Welsh law (once 423 
codified); (c) facilitate use of the Welsh language”.81 During the 2018 Legal Wales 424 
Conference the Counsel General announced his intention to introduce the Bill to the 425 
Assembly before the end of 2018, and that a proposed taxonomy of Codes of Welsh Law 426 
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would be Anneed to it. Welsh Codes will eventually constitute a digest of Welsh law, 427 
retaining existing distinctions between primary and secondary legislation (and guidance) but 428 
organised by subject-matter rather than date of enactment.  429 
 Whilst accessibility is the main goal, the pull towards codification may partially relate 430 
to a relative lack of judicial, practitioner and academic commentary (in effect to limited 431 
juridifcation). Anna Bargenda and Shona Wilson-Stark have recently suggested:  432 
 433 
“In Wales, the case for codification to carve out a national identity is more compelling 434 
because it could be said that Wales now has its own ‘living system of law’ after losing 435 
its legal identity centuries ago. In addition, Welsh lawyers have a dearth of textbooks 436 
to look to for guidance when the law is unclear. Having ‘so many excellent textbooks’ 437 
has been cited as a reason why codification is not needed in Scotland. The best 438 
textbooks provide accessible digests of the law which cut down the time needed to 439 
wade through all the primary sources”.82 440 
 441 
As the authors conclude, however, codification does not negate the need for commentary. 442 
The Counsel General also recognises this, stressing that the Law Wales website (currently the 443 
main repository for Welsh law and commentary) will continue to fall short of expectations 444 
without the collective engagement of practitioners, legislators, academics and other 445 
commentators.
83
 446 
 So far academic and practitioner commentary concerning codification in Wales has 447 
focused on whether Wales’ distinctive administrative procedure duties could be best 448 
articulated through an Administrative Procedure Code.
84
 A Code of this cross-cutting nature 449 
could tackle the complexity of multiplying procedural duties.
85
 Most legal jurisdictions 450 
across the world have an administrative procedure Code or Act of some kind, but with 451 
variations in the degree of specificity with which administrative procedure duties are 452 
expressed. A Code for Wales could consolidate existing duties, perhaps with some additions 453 
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such as extending the duty to have due regard to the UNCRC to all devolved Welsh public 454 
bodies, and adding a similar duty to have due regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of 455 
Persons With Disabilities, and UN Principles for Older Persons. Whether such a Code should 456 
also include Administrative Justice Principles for Wales and/or WFGA Ways of Working is a 457 
more complex matter; much would turn on phraseology and legislative balance between 458 
promotive duties and concrete rights, and how each is envisaged to be enforced.   459 
 Despite the growth of Welsh administrative procedure legislation, the majority of 460 
administrative law doctrines applying to Wales are still found in the common law of Wales 461 
and England. There are a number of issues for Wales here. One is simply the volume of 462 
administrative law principles stemming from common law. Another is the relationship 463 
between common law and statute, rarely will an administrative law case turn on a statutory 464 
procedural duty alone without common law precedent run either as vehicle to interpret the 465 
meaning and extent of the statutory duty, or as an additional legal ground. In the majority of 466 
judgments of the Administrative Court in Wales, aspects of the law applicable to the UK, the 467 
law applicable to England and Wales, and the law applicable to Wales only (as well as related 468 
policy/guidance), might all be considerations relevant to the lawfulness and/or reasonableness 469 
of the public body decision(s) being challenged. This is before one considers relevant 470 
regimes of EU and international law. In other cases, central issues of reasonableness and/or 471 
procedural fairness turn on careful examination of England and Wales common law 472 
precedent, with the specific Welsh statutory context having little impact. 473 
 It is possible that a distinct jurisprudence could eventually grow up around Welsh 474 
statutory duties, including the duty to have “due regard” to children’s rights or to “take all 475 
reasonable steps” to meet Well-being Goals. Welsh statutory requirements could also colour 476 
existing common law duties, for example what constitutes sufficient consultation in some 477 
Welsh contexts might be more extensive than in analogous English circumstances due to 478 
WFGA, and other Welsh legislation, requiring individuals to be “involved” in decision-479 
making. However, aside from the fact that it would take many years, and a much higher 480 
caseload, for such jurisprudence to develop, the willingness of the judiciary to engage in this 481 
process and the harmonising role of the higher appellate courts is crucial. Were the advent of 482 
a separate Welsh legal jurisdiction to lead to the establishment of a Welsh Court of Appeal, 483 
this would still be subject to the jurisdiction of the UK Supreme Court, which adopts a 484 
 19 
harmonising approach to administrative law principles, including for Scotland despite its 485 
separate legal jurisdiction.
86
   486 
In terms of developing a “Welsh common law” to date, it is less the development of 487 
statutory Welsh administrative law, and more the contribution of individual judges that could 488 
have some significance. The small caseload in Wales means that particular judges, especially 489 
those having served as Administrative Court Liaison Judge for Wales, have special influence. 490 
The most prolific judge so far has been Lord Justice Hickinbottom, who takes a cautious 491 
approach to the development of more contentious areas of precedent such as substantive 492 
review, having regularly affirmed that public bodies should be allowed significant 493 
discretion.
87
 There is evidence that Welsh judgments show sensitivity to the factual context 494 
of Wales, in terms of geographical and demographic characteristics, respect for culture and 495 
Welsh language,
88
 but there is no indication that Welsh substantive judgments depart, even 496 
incrementally, from general principles of administrative law applicable to England and 497 
Wales.   498 
The Administrative Court in Wales, is however, not the only judicial piece of the 499 
administrative justice puzzle. Recent activity, such as Part Three of the Wales Act 2017, and 500 
a proposed Law Commission project for 2019,
89
 seek to endow the body of devolved Welsh 501 
tribunals with greater coherence, professionalism and independence. The 2017 Act defines 502 
devolved Welsh tribunals as having functions that do not relate to reserved matters, and 503 
functions which are only exercisable in Wales. It creates a President of Welsh Tribunals to 504 
provide leadership, ensuring tribunals are accessible, fair, efficient, that their members have 505 
sufficient expertise, and having regard to “the need to develop innovative methods of 506 
resolving disputes”.90 The 2017 Act makes provision for “cross-deployment” of judges 507 
between various devolved Welsh tribunals (with the consent of the President of Welsh 508 
Tribunals).
91
 An aim here is to enhance the status of the Welsh judiciary, making it a busier 509 
and more attractive profession for home-grown talent. Judges have now been authorised for 510 
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cross-deployment, for example between the Residential Property Tribunal for Wales and the 511 
Special Educational Needs Tribunal for Wales. It has been argued that how Wales manages 512 
the development and operation of its tribunals system is an important test for how it might 513 
cope with further devolution of responsibility for the administration of justice.
92
  514 
In this context it is somewhat surprising that when creating new administrative law 515 
duties, Welsh Government and the Assembly have continued to choose reserved tribunals and 516 
courts as institutions of redress, largely on the basis that devolved Welsh tribunals currently 517 
lack the resources, in terms of finance and expertise, to handle significant additional 518 
caseloads.
93
 Yet it is Welsh Government which funds devolved Welsh tribunals, and central 519 
UK Government which funds courts and reserved tribunals.  520 
It has been recommended that Wales adopts a presumption that new administrative 521 
law duties enacted by the Assembly should be subject to enforcement procedures in the 522 
devolved Welsh tribunals, as opposed to in reserved tribunals or courts.
94
 Adopting such a 523 
presumption would mean more cases being determined in Wales, and could eventually lead 524 
to greater juridification of Welsh administrative justice, especially alongside other reforms to 525 
enhance the status of the Welsh judiciary. In this regard, a leadership steer from the 526 
Administrative Court in Wales would also be significant, though dependent on who occupies 527 
the post of Liaison Judge.  528 
 529 
Lessons from the “New Administrative Law” of Wales 530 
 531 
At a global level “new administrative law” is a response to concerns over the legitimacy of 532 
the evolving administrative state. The emergent Welsh version is grounded in a vision of 533 
good administration as a civic good. This is evident in the political ideal of ‘progressive 534 
consensus’, in the current Counsel General’s vision of a just Wales, and in CAJTW’s 535 
expression of administrative justice as a “fundamental right”.95 The notion of the good here is 536 
an Aristotelian account of doing the right thing, anchored in consensus through civic 537 
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participation. Such an account of the good is echoed in recent conceptions of European good 538 
administration across Council of Europe member states.
96
 It also seems to be a feature of 539 
WFGA Well-being Goals, which are not envisaged to require a trade-off (qua utilitarian 540 
calculus), but rather working incrementally towards ‘win-win’ solutions. On this 541 
understanding the goodness (or legitimacy) of the administration is not (or at least not only) 542 
quantified by reference to whether its actions comply with some pre-determined legal 543 
standards, but by reference to whether it exhibits the characteristics of a good person. In 544 
Wales, the integrity institutions combine to promote and enforce this sense of goodness. The 545 
Welsh experience then also seems to embody Nick O’Brien’s view that “administrative 546 
justice can be viewed, in essence, as a set of ‘bridging institutions’ whose cultivation of the 547 
‘habits’ of trust and civic virtue are made possible by the adoption of design principles and 548 
operational practices that in turn are shaped by human rights values and principles”.97 Wales 549 
already has a bridging infrastructure largely in place, more problematic is its lack of a 550 
separate justice system in the traditional sense of courts, tribunals, and the judiciary; there are 551 
only two branches of state (executive and legislative) for administrative justice institutions to 552 
bridge across.  553 
Attempts to bridge between integrity institutions and the non-devolved courts have 554 
come up against the practical barriers of devolution; one example is the relationship between 555 
the PSOW and the courts. It has been proposed that the Law Commission’s 2011 556 
recommendations relating to the relationship between courts and ombudsmen could be 557 
implemented in Wales. These proposals include removing the statutory bar to ombudsmen 558 
investigations where a complainant has recourse to a remedy through a court or tribunal, 559 
giving the ombudsman power to refer a point of law to the Administrative Court, and giving 560 
the Administrative Court an express power to “stay” actions before it to allow an ombudsman 561 
to investigate. These proposals were considered by the Assembly Finance Committee, but 562 
rejected due to unease about altering the relationship between a UK ombudsman and the 563 
courts on a Wales-only basis.
98
  564 
More progress has been made, in theory, to bridge between the integrity institutions in 565 
Wales. For example, there are statutory duties and powers in place encouraging the 566 
Commissioners to work together and with other institutions. However, it is not clear how 567 
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well these provisions are functioning in practice. Similarly, there is a Memorandum of 568 
Understanding between the Commissioners and the PSOW, but little evidence of its practical 569 
effectiveness, and few successful examples of joint-working.  570 
 Bridging can also lead to conflict; one example is an apparent “Facebook spat” 571 
between the PSOW and Welsh Language Commissioner.
99
 In response to proposals to reform 572 
the Welsh Language protection regime, the PSOW postulated that his office could take over 573 
responsibility for complaints. This was described as a ‘power grab’ and breaching an 574 
agreement between the PSOW and the Commissioner that they would not comment on each 575 
other’s work. Sensational reporting aside, concerns remain that whilst Wales has at least three 576 
types of integrity institutions – regulators, citizen’s champions, and complaint handlers – 577 
confusion remains over their functions and accountability and where they ought to sit within 578 
the broader administrative justice system.  This has significant financial as well as access to 579 
justice implications. For example, the Director of Policy, Legislation and Innovation for the 580 
Future Generations Commissioner has noted that one of the most resource intensive 581 
challenges for the Commissioner has been responding to the enormous number of enquiries 582 
raising individual complaints that the Commissioner has no jurisdiction to investigate.
100
  583 
Welsh administrative justice is also affected by bigger political challenges. The 584 
administrative justice culture of the current UK Conservative Government is individualistic; a 585 
market-based conception in which the user is seen as a consumer of public services and 586 
related redress. The growth of individualist conceptions of administrative justice is a global 587 
phenomenon, also linked to the marketisation of welfare.
101
 This conception does not fit with 588 
the Welsh progressive consensus, and the continued reservation of responsibility for social 589 
security inhibits delivery of Welsh initiatives designed to improve substantive equality.
102
 590 
Another example of different perceptions around the public-private divide and market context 591 
is the Renting Homes (Wales) Act 2016. This replaces the majority of tenancies and licenses 592 
in Wales with two types of contract (one for the private sector and one for social housing). 593 
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The legislative changes are modelled on Law Commission recommendations which were 594 
rejected in England for being out of line with the Government’s deregulatory priorities. 595 
Marketisation of administrative justice is also occurring during a period of austerity 596 
and integrity institutions have been described as providing access to justice on the cheap 597 
when the Rolls-Royce of judicial justice becomes too expensive.
103
 Of the small judicial 598 
review caseload stemming from Wales, many cases  concern austerity-related cuts to public 599 
services.
104
 Welsh Government’s reluctant to divert a higher caseload into the devolved 600 
tribunals is likely also related to the costs of running these devolved institutions for which it 601 
has financial responsibility.  602 
The Welsh promotive approach relies significantly on engaging public servants and 603 
broader civil society. For procedures such as impact assessment processes to be legitimate, 604 
civil society actors should be engaged in interpreting the rights and goals that must be taken 605 
into account. There is, however, a risk of creating more limited “interpretive communities”105 606 
comprised mainly of government and civil society actors who take a community or personal 607 
interest in the issue at stake. Without the widest possible participation of a range of interests, 608 
interpreting rights and goals can be “colonised by dominant institutional forces”.106 As is 609 
likely the case for civil society conglomerates globally, the main challenges for Wales stem 610 
from comparative levels of citizen engagement with societal challenges, and the available 611 
sources and quantum of funding for civil society organisations. There is, however, an evident 612 
movement to engage people with justice in Wales in its broadest sense, from the recent 613 
Commission for Justice in Wales, to the outreach activities of the Counsel General and the 614 
proposed Draft Legislation (Wales) Bill on legal accessibility.  615 
 Despite the approach constructed in this paper, in truth Welsh administrative law and 616 
the Welsh system of administrative justice have developed in a largely uncoordinated 617 
fashion. Oversight is limited, with no Assembly Committee having responsibility for 618 
administrative justice and tribunals in Wales, though the subject has been discussed in the 619 
Assembly.
107
 The Welsh approach evidences potential to achieve incremental improvements 620 
to good administration through a degree of progressive consensus around equality, social 621 
justice and rights. Through its new administrative procedure law, and the work of its integrity 622 
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institutions, Wales has begun to better engage people with their administrative law rights, the 623 
next step will be to see whether and how successfully, Wales develops a clearer, and perhaps 624 
more juridified, structure to ensure those rights are fully respected.  625 
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